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Leon Kass and James Wilson, The Ethics of Human Cloning (The AEI Press: Washington D.C., 1998) Gregory Spence, Who's Afraid of Human Cloning? (Roman and Littlefield: Lanham, Maryland, 1998). Review by Tom W. Miller |
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Ian Wilmut's announcement, in 1997, that he and his team at Roslin had created Dolly from an adult sheep cell, sparked a flurry of articles and books on the prospects of human cloning. These writings generally assumed that scientists could clone humans; instead, the debate focused on whether scientists should clone humans. Subsequent success in cloning other mammals such as mice, pigs, and cats supported the direction of this dialogue. As researchers refine their cloning techniques, the bioethics of human cloning become an even more pressing matter for people to consider. The Ethics of Human Cloning attempts to encapsulate this debate by reprinting two prominent essays written after the announcement of Dolly. In "The Wisdom of Repugnance," Leon Kass makes a heartfelt case against human cloning. Kass bids his readers take note of the widespread repugnance toward human cloning-"an emotional expression of deep wisdom, beyond reason's power to fully articulate it" (p. 18). In this sense, human cloning is on a par with incest, cannibalism, rape and murder. Kass then attempts to fully articulate the source of this popular repugnance. Sex, argues Kass, is not only pleasurable, but critical to human identity and social stability. Sexual reproduction creates a unique and novel person. It clearly establishes the members of the nuclear family. People's sexual needs make them reach out to the opposite sex "with special interest and intensity" (p. 28). Sex is a way of acknowledging mankind's finiteness. Two people produce a totally new being, and the old perish. As Kass puts it, "when we are sexually active, we are voting with our genitalia for our own demise" (p. 29). Asexual human cloning undermines these critical foundations. Cloning is nothing but "an extension...of rootless and narcissistic self-creation" (p. 9). Cloning transforms procreation with all of its wondrous mystery into predictable manufacture. Cloning is also "inherently despotic" (p. 42), because the child receives a genotype already lived. Even benevolent parents will have certain expectations of the cloned child based on the previous life of the genetic donor. To those who think human cloning is no big deal, Kass offers the logic of the slippery slope. The descent began with other techniques of assisted reproduction, especially in vitro fertilization. Defenders of IVF argued that the technology would not necessarily lead to more artificial practices, that scientists could draw a line between acceptable and unacceptable techniques. But defense of human cloning belies this argument and proves the existence of a slippery slope. Under the banner of reproductive freedom, bioethicists, and society in general are in danger of falling into the pit at the bottom of this slope. For this reason, Kass also opposes allowing the cloning of embryos for research. Kass recognizes many of the potential benefits of this work, but feels it would be too easy to circumvent regulations on this practice. Again, to avoid a slippery slide, policy makers have no choice but to ban the cloning of embryos. To oppose Kass, the book offers James Wilson's essay, "The Paradox of Human Cloning." Wilson sees risks associated with human cloning. By maximizing certain genomes and traits, cloning could impede evolution and genetic diversity. Moreover, the cloned child might "be put to various harmful uses" (p. 64). But Wilson sees benefits from cloning as an infertility treatment and adoption substitute. Wilson concludes that the benefits of human cloning outweigh the risks provided that two conditions are met. First, only married couples should be allowed to have clones. Second, the wife should gestate and give birth to the clone. If these conditions are met, according to Wilson, "then the offspring would belong to the parents" (p. 72). Natural parental instincts would kick in and protect the cloned child from abuse. Wilson's essay, though a valuable commentary on its own, weakens the book as a whole. Wilson's tepid support for human cloning fails to balance Kass's strong rebuke. Wilson admits, "I instinctively recoil from the idea" (p. 61) of human cloning, thus acknowledging the repugnance about which Kass writes. In his rebuttal to Kass, Wilson writes that he has no idea how to limit cloning to married, heterosexual couples. "If no one can solve that puzzle," Wilson concludes, "I would join Dr. Kass in banning human cloning" (p. 99). To debate the ethics of human cloning genuinely, somebody needs to defend the procedure as strongly as Kass attacks it. Gregory Pence provides this defense in his book, Who's Afraid of Human Cloning? Pence blanches at the one-sided nature of the "debate" over human cloning. Pence makes a strong argument for human cloning not only to balance the dialogue but also "because I believe that my position is true" (p. xii). The public's repugnance of human cloning does not reflect any deep wisdom, says Pence, but stems from science fiction and myth. If people strip away these things, they will recognize cloning for the beneficent, progressive technology that it is. Clones would be unique individuals, argues Pence. Environment plays a huge role in determining a person's makeup. The environment affects how genes are expressed and brains are wired. Natural clones-identical twins-are different people, says Pence, so why should clones be any less unique? Because clones would possess the mitochondrial DNA from the donor egg, their genomes would not even be exact duplicates of their progenitors. Pence also directly addresses Kass's argument for "the profundity of sex." Kass has mistaken the current cultural attitude toward sex for a profound and constant truth. Sex itself was at one time seen as morally repugnant, but in modern western thought, sex has come to symbolize love and healthy marriage. Sex, says Pence, is neither a great evil nor the key to human identity. "Sex is sex, and need not be anything more" (p. 82). Futhermore, people who clone themselves are not necessarily narcissistic or despotic. These charges assume bad motives on the parents' part. Parents may very well have expectations of their cloned children, but who's to say that parents would not change when faced with their child's unique personality and aspirations? Parents today make these kinds of adjustments, so why not parents of the future. Pence takes issue with the slippery slope arguments that Kass and other opponents of cloning have offered. People (including Kass with IVF) have predicted ethical slides in response to technologies such as computers, assisted reproduction, euthanasia and abortion, but none of the dire predictions have occurred. At the bottom of cloning's so-called slippery slope, Pence sees "children who lack genetic dysfunction" and are "as talented, healthy, and lovable as possible" (p. 70). The public should not let slippery slope arguments make it fear change. Pence also feels that fear of a slippery slope lies at the root of the controversy over research on human embryos. Experimenting with embryos need not translate into killing fetuses and babies. Embryos, according to Pence, have no consciousness, no cognition, and thus are not persons. They may have the potential to become persons, but so do 30-40 percent of all naturally created embryos that fail to implant in the uterus. Scientists should be given the freedom to experiment with embryos in order to help actual persons. After studying the detailed arguments of both Pence and Kass, I feel that Pence provides a more convincing case. I think that after the initial exposure to cloned children, the public will understand that clones are unique, autonomous individuals. Moreover, because of the expense and trouble that people will have to go through to have a clone, I agree with Pence that the practice will never be widespread. Given that assumption, a few cloned children seem unlikely to undermine "the profundity of sex," assuming such a profundity ever existed. Popular culture, especially movies and television, has already done a thorough job of eliminating the mystery and special nature of the sexual act. Kass's essay, however, will continue to resonate with people who do not share Pence's more optimistic view of human nature. Before writing this review, I asked my wife if she found human cloning repugnant. "Not repugnant, but disturbing," she said. When I asked her to explain, she answered that people would not be able to help having overbearing expectations of the clone. When I countered, a la Pence, that she was assuming bad parental motives, she agreed wholeheartedly with me. In the end, if human cloning is to proceed in an ethical fashion, bioethics must constantly remind us of our past ethical failures. |
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